The so-called Islamic State's opportunistic strategy in Libya has been effective but, their draconian governing has been met with increased resistance.
Over the last year the Islamic State gained control of a substantial portion of Syria's energy resources and infrastructure, providing leverage over the regime and depriving it of much needed revenue.
With the recent capture of the city of Palmyra, the Islamic State has reasserted its anti-Assad credentials and put another tremendous economic strain on the Syrian government.
With no discernible end or victor in sight, stateless violence and spheres of influence controlled by various factions may become the norm in Syria.
Rumors are again circulating regarding the health of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, sparking discussions of potential replacements and their necessary qualifications.
Two of Syria’s most prominent rebel groups—Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham—have announced their merger into the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement. But will it last?
The Islamic State is no longer winning, but recent victories against the militant group have done little to address the long-standing grievances at the root of its emergence and continued appeal.
The presence and influence of the Islamic State continues to spread in the civil war chaos of post-Qaddafi Libya, inserting itself into an already messy conflict between the rival Operation Dignity and Operation Dawn.
Despite his call for a “religious revolution” in Islam, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s gestures fit into a pattern of instrumentalizing religion for political purposes. Religious freedom under Sisi’s presidency may not be worse than it was under Mubarak or Morsi, but it is certainly no better.
The horrific attacks in France bring back to the fore the question of what it means to be a citizen in Europe today and how such citizenship intersects with the burning questions of class and multiple cultural identities.
A military confrontation is building up between two powerful jihadist factions, the Islamic State and the Nusra Front, in southern and southwestern Syria and as the balance shifts, the Islamic State stands poised to grow in new regions.
Jordan has been deeply concerned about the effect of Syria’s civil war on its security. It has taken several counterterrorism measures, but its strategy in combating the threat of radicalism has been flawed.
The Revolutionary Command Council has arrived in a time of crisis for Syria’s rebels. If it survives its formative period without major splits, it may well establish itself as the new political framework for most of the Syrian opposition.
The refugee influx, fighting along the Lebanese-Syrian border, and the intervention of Lebanese Shia and Sunni Islamists on opposite sides in Syria’s civil war have all contributed greatly to the withering of Lebanon’s already precarious stability.
By arguing against Iraqis being drawn into cross-border sectarian struggles, Muqtada al-Sadr has positioned himself as an important voice of reason within the Shia community that dominates Iraq.
Ahrar al-Sham has long been seen as one of the “swing voters” of the Syrian insurgency, and it may turn out to be pivotal in the current struggle for northwestern Syria.
U.S. fighter jets, bombers, and drones have recently struck several targets in the Sarmada region of Idlib Province in northwest Syria, near the Turkish border. The targets of the attack have proven to be both disputed and controversial.
With the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front consolidating its control over key regions in Idlib, the group now appears to be the single strongest faction in northwestern Syria, shifting the power on the ground.
By seizing Sanaa and its security apparatus, the Iran-linked Houthis have imposed a new political reality in Yemen. But to secure their influence, they will eventually need to seek accommodation with Saudi Arabia.
Most Islamic State fighters on the ground are local Syrians and Iraqis. Many of them are conservative and religious, but the vast majority are not ideological Salafi-jihadis.