The constitutional declaration put forward by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces in Egypt is a complicated and problematic document that does not resolve the fundamental issues facing the transition process.
Protest in Bahrain is not simply a domestic struggle for political rights and liberal reform; it is also a sectarian conflict between a Sunni monarchy in a majority-Shia country that is rapidly becoming part of a growing conflict between Saudi Arabia and the United States.
Popular protests have spread across the Middle East and North Africa and have reached Iraq and Kurdistan. The political circumstances in these regions will determine whether the protests succeed in forcing the government to respond to the demands of its citizens.
After a momentous two months, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood must now decide how to organize a political party, direct its political participation, and handle the emergence of a group of activist youth leaders.
The feelings of optimism and hope that accompanied the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions have recently been mixed with concern over the course of events in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and other countries.
The launch of U.S. and European military operations against Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi could have unexpected consequences and encourage some regimes to step up their efforts to develop a weapons arsenal in order to prevent the possibility of outside attack.
As Egyptians move toward a referendum on suggested amendments to the country’s constitution, the country faces an opportunity for the first time in its history to write a constitution its citizens want rather than one drafted for them by deeply entrenched incumbents.
The Egyptian constitutional reform committee appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced several proposed revisions to Egypt's constitution on February 26. On March 19, Egyptians will vote in a referendum concerning these amendments.
Even if Egypt succeeds in holding completely free presidential and parliamentary elections, there is no way for the country to make a transition to real democracy if its internal security services resume their pre-January 25 mode of operation.
As regional and international opinion moves in favor of supporting the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey should all participate in its implementation.
Saudi Arabia is extremely unlikely to experience the turmoil seen elsewhere in the region, since the Saudi kingdom is among the best equipped to handle the wave of popular protests roiling the Arab world.
A year after the Iraqi elections, the struggle for power between Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and his rival Ayad Allawi could threaten Iraq’s progress toward stability, security, and democracy.
One major risk coming out of Libya’s escalating internal turmoil is the ability for dangerous Islamist fighters who were previously in custody to threaten U.S. interests.
Proposed amendments to Egypt’s constitution meet some longstanding opposition and civil society demands but may also create new uncertainties.
In spite of the massive popular protests that have swept away two Arab strongmen and shaken half a dozen monarchies and republics, the Arab world has yet to witness any fundamental change in ruling elites and even less in the nature of governance.
China's leaders have exercised tight control over media coverage of the Middle East protests and reacted quickly to quell any domestic civil unrest.
The Egyptian economic reforms Washington invested in for decades are at risk of unraveling due to the lack of serious political reforms.
Regional Islamist movements are struck by suddenly open avenues for political activity following the unrest in Egypt and Tunisia, but they have yet to decide how to respond to these new opportunities.
As Palestinians observe the growing unrest across the region, there is a growing awareness while the situation in Palestine is unsustainable, there seem to be no viable alternatives.
The deep and broad popular consensus to maintain the Jordanian monarchy is based less on the people's loyalty to Hashimites and more on their suspicions of each other.