Delivering on the great expectations of Tunisians means living up to the fundamental principles enshrined in the constitution and their promise of social justice.
The Arab states in transition are confronted with a seemingly intractable task: rebuilding state institutions and social contracts in an era of global change. Conventional approaches to security sector reform that fail to grasp the dilemmas and challenges complicating this effort are certain to fail.
Iraq’s Sunni Arabs face a crisis of representation underlined by intra- and inter-community contestations. Understanding their predicament is the first step to reengagement.
The clash of visions over the Iraqi state’s identity, legitimacy, and ownership, long predating the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2003, has been the root cause of political violence in postwar Arab Iraq.
The refugee tragedy is a symptom of a wider political crisis. Finding adequate solutions for the refugees and internally displaced populations is primarily a political imperative, but it is also a development challenge that is essential for political stabilization, societal reconciliation, and peace building.
Egypt could be facing a dangerous Islamist insurgency unless the state formulates proper strategies to tackle the fragmented Islamist political scene.
The Tunisian government and other political and religious actors need to work together on a de-radicalization strategy that brings reform to both the political and the religious spheres.
The Iranian nuclear agreement presents an opportunity to take a first step toward creating a new security order in the Gulf, one that could improve relations between Iran and the Gulf Arab states and facilitate a lessening of the U.S. military commitment.
If Jordan is to confront its national challenges and continue to provide a safe haven for Syrian refugees, the country will depend on increased international support.
After having made some gains for several years starting in the mid-2000s, Egypt’s labor movement has come under severe restrictions since the reimposition of military-led authoritarianism in mid-2013.
The Kurdistan region of Iraq enjoys more stability, economic development, and political pluralism than the rest of the country. But this assessment fails to recognize key parts of the story.
The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest opposition movement and one of its oldest, is squeezed between an unprecedented crackdown from the security state and a young generation pushing for more assertive action against the regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
The Assad regime has established itself as the irreplaceable provider of essential services in Syria. Solving the Syrian crisis requires breaking this grip.
Gaps in the international coalition’s approach as well as deep sectarian divisions in Iraq and the shifting strategies of the Syrian regime and its allies are allowing the Islamic State to continue to exist and expand.
Libya and Yemen will not reemerge as sovereign states without resolving fundamental struggles over the purpose and form of their security sectors.
The intensity of Moscow’s current contact with Tehran is unprecedented in Russia’s post-Soviet history. Yet despite the potential for improvement, there are serious obstacles that may hamper or even halt cooperation.
The ouster of Mohamed Morsi by a popularly backed military coup in 2013 dealt a debilitating blow to the Islamist project—and left deep cleavages within the Salafist movement.
Western democratic powers are no longer the dominant external shapers of political transitions around the world.
Egypt’s political scene has changed radically from the vigorous pluralism that followed the 2011 uprising; in 2015 the Islamist and secular groups that won those elections are excluded or marginalized.
The Egyptian military has gained unprecedented power since overseeing the ouster of two Egyptian presidents, Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and Mohamed Morsi in 2013. But political overreach and internal rivalries may prove obstacles to long-term military control.