Turkey is in the midst of a deepening political crisis with far-reaching consequences. That is worrisome not just at home but also for outside actors, especially the EU.
When Tehran agreed in November to the interim deal and the U.S. Senate moved to increase sanctions, it reinforced the idea in Iran that no matter they do, good or bad behavior, the same answer comes out of the United States.
For Iran to admit that it worked on nuclear weapons would be more significant than Iran’s 2003 statement that it failed to declare to the IAEA a flurry of nuclear activities which could be justified by Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not driven primarily by a Sunni-Shiite divide or even Arab-Persian ethnic differences. The conflict is informed by two radically different models of government and two very different visions of regional order.
Reaching a final agreement with Iran over its nuclear program is going to require some very hard compromises from hardliners both in Tehran and in Washington.
Rather than undermining nuclear negotiations, moves by Western businesses preparing to capitalize on a possible deal have the potential to spur pressure for change within Iran.
Throughout the Middle East, the overthrow of Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi has heightened Islamist-secularist tensions and pushed actors toward zero-sum politics.
Recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee highlighted an interesting—and unrealistic—approach to negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.
The fatal flaw in American policy can be traced back to the Truman years. What happened between 1945 and 1949 sealed the fate of the Middle East for the remainder of the century.
An influential Islamic social movement has advanced Turkey’s soft power for decades, but an emerging power struggle between the movement and Ankara could change all that.