Amid reports that the Yemen conflict may soon be resolved in the aftermath of the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, what are the prospects for a breakthrough on the presential election in Lebanon? Optimists would say that they are good, and they may be right. However, what we’ve seen in recent weeks is something more complicated, namely an effort by the Saudis and by Hezbollah and their Iranian patrons to define their margin of maneuver in Lebanon and clarify how they interpret implementation of the reconciliation on the Lebanese scene.
When Hezbollah endorsed Suleiman Franjieh as president in March, the Saudi reaction was immediate. The kingdom’s ambassador in Lebanon visited the Maronite patriarch, Bishara al-Rai, and reportedly expressed his opposition to Franjieh. This was not surprising, as the Saudi position is that since the speaker of parliament is in Hezbollah’s camp and a future prime minister would be closer to Riyadh, the next president must be somewhere in the middle.
That thinking is precisely why the Saudis were so irritated initially by French efforts to peddle Franjieh’s candidacy to them. The French argued that a Franjieh presidency could be counterbalanced by a pro-Saudi prime minister such as Nawaf Salam, until Riyadh reminded them that they had forgotten Berri in their calculations. Franjieh’s recent visit to Paris added to the confusion. He was invited by the French after a conversation between President Emmanuel Macron and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in which Macron thought he saw an opening for Franjieh to present guarantees that would assuage the Saudis.
Saudi coolness toward Franjieh suggests that, for all the talk of the kingdom’s indifference to Lebanon, the country remains on its list of concerns. In fact, the kingdom apparently sees its reconciliation with Iran as paving the way for a greater Saudi role on the Lebanese scene, one in which it is entitled to both expand and defend its political preferences. And indeed, the speed with which the Lebanese authorities (certainly with Hezbollah’s approval) recently closed down two Houthi television stations broadcasting from Beirut suggests the Iranians and Hezbollah are willing to bend to certain Saudi demands in the country.
This is all the more evident in that Hezbollah accepts the idea of negotiating with the Saudis over a president. The proposal for a quid pro quo in which the pro-Hezbollah Franjieh would be elected alongside a pro-Saudi Salam was first mentioned in the Al-Akhbar newspaper by its editor Ibrahim Amin, who frequently launches the party’s trial balloons. For Hezbollah, Lebanon’s dire financial situation means that a reconciliation with the Gulf states is desirable, as potential Arab aid would allow Lebanon to rely less on the International Monetary Fund, which the party regards as an institution controlled by the United States. But are there limits to how far Iran and Hezbollah will concede to the Saudis?
The answer came last week, when rockets were fired against Israel’s north. The alleged culprit was Hamas, but only the most naïve observer would assume that Hezbollah had nothing to do with it, all the more so as the very next day Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, met with Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah. There has been much discussion that Hezbollah, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and pro-Iranian Syrian groups have set up a joint operations room in Beirut to coordinate their military actions against Israel, a collaboration that perceptive commentators already saw coming a year ago.
In the context of the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, the attack implied that when it came to Hezbollah’s regional role, the reconciliation did not change much, at least when the party’s actions did not affect Saudi Arabia directly. If anything, it seemed to indicate that from the Iranians’ perspective, the fact that they no longer had to worry about the Saudis allowed them to focus more on combating Israel. Like Saudi Arabia, Iran appears to be interpreting the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation as a green light to accentuate its own stakes in Lebanon.
What does this mean for the presidential election? It means we are probably heading toward a package deal that goes beyond electing a president, to agreeing to a prime minister as well as a consensual governmental program, with some money thrown in. Saudi Arabia and Iran will be central actors in this process. If things are taking time, it’s because it’s more difficult to negotiate a multifaceted deal in which most sides must get what they want than it is simply to approve a president.
The party that is best able to mediate in bringing all these disparate pieces together is Qatar. France had wanted to play such a role, but Macron’s ill-advised endorsement of Franjieh has undermined Paris’ credibility. When France hosted a five-country meeting on Lebanon in February, the participants pointedly avoided mentioning any names. They preferred to outline the characteristics of the candidate they would support—primarily that of a “centrist, who belongs to none of the political camps, and who is not viewed as a provocation by any of the protagonists,” according to an Arab diplomat cited by journalist Mounir Rabih.
By jumping ahead and naming Franjieh, the French not only ignored this approach, they chose a candidate with attributes in complete contradiction to the ones publicly sought by the participants in Paris. By backing Franjieh, the French are now seen to have divided the members of the conclave, to Hezbollah’s advantage. Earlier this month, Qatar’s minister of state for foreign relations, Abdel Aziz al-Khulaifi, visited Beirut and met with, among others, the head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, Mohammed Raad. More time is needed to reach a broad consensus, but at least the mechanism of progress appears to be taking shape.
It is worth looking elsewhere to see how things might play out, namely toward Syria. There has long been a perception that the Arab states are comfortable dealing with Lebanon through Damascus, which, though weak, still has networks in the country. As Syria is brought back into the Arab fold, is a return to the past possible? The Syrians are too weak to resurrect the hegemony they once enjoyed, but if, alongside Hezbollah, they support Franjieh in any package deal, it is not impossible that he may emerge as president, provided other leading Lebanese parties get what they want in return. Until all the bricks fall into place, all options will remain open.
