Carnegie Middle East Center
Russia’s September 2015 aerial intervention in Syria would not have succeeded without a parallel Iranian intervention on the ground.
With the outbreak of the most recent round of conflict after the 2011 uprisings, sectarian discourse in Yemen has grown increasingly heated.
Iraq’s al-Hashd al-Shaabi militias have challenged the state’s monopoly on force but have also played a critical role in the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State.
The new United Nations peace process for Syria will operate on two tracks with the hope of building the necessary critical mass to stem the violence.
The recent nuclear agreement with Iran will likely have far-reaching effects on conflicts across the Middle East, particularly the war in Yemen.
The road to a political agreement in Syria remains long and bumpy as the priorities of different actors continue to diverge widely.
Despite significant involvement in Syria, Russia's ability to influence the regime of President Bashar al-Assad is more limited than it may appear.
Iran has signed a historic agreement regarding its nuclear program which will have subsequent effects on its regional clients, particularly Syria.
As violence continues in Yemen, old regional and geographical fault lines are opening up again, undermining Yemen’s unity without offering any realistic alternative to the current borders.
A wide coalition of Syrian rebel groups have announced that they will boycott political talks proposed by the United Nations. Aron Lund interviews Subhi al-Refai on these developments.
Kerry's recent comments about negotiating with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad sparked controversy on both sides of the Atlantic. But what did he actually say?
Assad seems to be giving up on the reintegration of rebel-held Syria into the state apparatus. Thus, entrenching himself among the militias and what remains of his army, he has precious little left to offer anyone else—no carrot, only stick.
Kurdish-Arab clashes in Syria’s civil war have a history of flaring up violently and then dying down with little fanfare, including in Hasakah. But if the fighting continues, it may have a serious impact on the military balance in the city and the surrounding countryside.
The chances of success for the much-discussed Russian initiative to end the war in Syria seem slim at best—because Moscow has called a peace meeting with only one of the warring parties in attendance.
In recent months, there has been a flurry of diplomatic movement in the Syrian conflict, as Russia and Iran, the two main allies of Bashar al-Assad, are trying to seize the initiative and pave the way for a new political deal.
By arguing against Iraqis being drawn into cross-border sectarian struggles, Muqtada al-Sadr has positioned himself as an important voice of reason within the Shia community that dominates Iraq.
By seizing Sanaa and its security apparatus, the Iran-linked Houthis have imposed a new political reality in Yemen. But to secure their influence, they will eventually need to seek accommodation with Saudi Arabia.
Leaving Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul in rebel hands could fatally undermine Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s already weak legitimacy as a national leader. But even if the army were to recapture all or most of the rebel-held cities, the Mosul debacle has already dealt a tremendous blow not only to Maliki but to the Iraqi state as well.
If the Syrian regime recaptures Old Homs, it will further cement Bashar al-Assad’s grip on an area of Syria he truly cannot afford to relinquish.
Competing regional agendas continue to drive the two leading Kurdish actors in the region apart and because of this, they cannot agree on a joint policy to aid the Syrian Kurds.