On political matters, just as in religious affairs, the Islamic Front has staked out a hawkish position. Its officials say that they are firmly opposed to any peace deal with the regime and seem unwilling to hold talks even on minor matters.
Any attempt to describe the Islamic Front’s ideology is complicated by the fact that even some of its members seem puzzled by it. The member factions still serve under different leaderships, and there is no guarantee that they will be able to coordinate their policies or keep disagreements under control.
As soon as it announced its formation on November 22, 2013, it was clear that the Islamic Front would be a powerful influence on Syria’s future and a key actor in the rebellion against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
The Baath Battalions, a militia controlled by the ruling Baath Arab Socialist Party, has started to show up at government checkpoints and roadblocks in Damascus, with aims to support the Syrian Arab Army and the security services.
While the Islamic legitimacy of the armed opposition to the Syrian regime remains uncontested among the Salafi-jihadi radicals, the decisive, dividing concern is simple: Which jihadi faction should the Egyptian Salafi-jihadi movement support?
Syria is developing a “war economy” as individuals and networks seek to exploit the opportunities of conflict
The Islamic Front contains some of Syria’s most powerful rebel groups, particularly in the now-contested northern areas, and its position will matter for the outcome of the fighting between rival rebel groups.
The violence that erupted on January 3 was preceded by several months of rapidly worsening relations between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the rebel mainstream. Two newly formed northern coalitions have led the charge against the ISIL, the Syria Revolutionaries’ Front (SRF) and the Mujahideen Army.
The fighting that erupted on January 3 has been driven the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from several of its strongholds in northern Syria by rival rebel factions.
The Tawhid Brigade is one of Syria’s largest armed rebel groups fighting against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and dominating much of the insurgency around Aleppo.
Many Lebanese Alawites do not seem particularly keen on being associated with their co-religionists in Syria, and they are especially wary of being linked to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
The Arab Democratic Party (ADP) has long been the representative of Lebanon’s tiny Alawite community. Its long-standing alliance with the Assad regime has ensured its political and paramilitary hegemony over Lebanon’s Alawites. But new Alawite voices are emerging that are more critical of the Assad regime and of the ADP.
Isolating Iran from the Syria peace talks is no longer a realistic option.
The extension of the Salafi rebel group, the Islamic State of Iraq, into Syria has finally put an end to the debate of whether al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia has been dissolved.
The People’s Protection Units (YPG), a secular-leftist armed faction, has been in control of most of the Kurdish areas of northern Syria.
One of the most elusive questions around Gulf donations to rebel brigades in Syria is how they arrive and understanding the logistics is key to any efforts to cut off the funds to extremist-linked groups.
For some months now, rumors have been making the rounds about a resumption of intelligence cooperation between certain European states and the government in Damascus.
Osama Amin al-Shihabi, a well-established actor on the Levantine jihadi scene, has recently been appointed head of the Nusra Front’s Palestinian wing in Lebanon.
Syria’s refugee crisis is one of the most pressing humanitarian problems in the world today. More than one-third of Syria’s population is now estimated to have fled the conflict.
The conflict among rebels at the strategic Bab al-Hawa border crossing into Turkey has rattled both the Syrian opposition and its foreign backers.