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The loss of the Arab world’s commitment to an end of Israel’s occupation as a precondition for Middle East peace will spell the death knell for a negotiated political solution.
The current parliament is the most fractured in Tunisia’s history, with no party holding even one-quarter of the seats.
The seismic event felt like an earthquake and an air raid wrapped into one. None of us in Lebanon have ever experienced anything like it.
Applying Israeli law to much of the West Bank would mean the irreversible end of the Palestinian statehood project, making Netanyahu the prime minister who not only buried the two-state solution but annexed choice West Bank real estate.
Nearly a decade after the revolution in Tunisia, much of the crucial legislation designed to protect women exists on paper alone, with significant work remaining to implement the laws.
Constitutional amendments would allow Algiers to participate in peacekeeping operations and send army units abroad.
Despite ongoing public dissatisfaction with the government, Algerians, along with much of the global population, remain confined to their homes.
As the Lebanese lock down, Beirut is being forced to realise how unsustainable its political and economic choices have been.
Shaykh al-Azhar Ahmed al-Tayyib criticized the state of Arabs and Muslims worldwide–including, one presumes, its rulers.
Whatever Israel and the Palestinians need to succeed in making peace, what they don’t need is a framework that may well have hung a closed-for-the-season sign both on a viable peace process and Washington’s credibility as a fair and effective broker.
The new Lebanese government must deal with the gargantuan task of an economic meltdown of historic proportions.
The last time Libya’s war had the world’s full attention, it was being fought mainly by Libyans.
Animated by an extreme pro-Israeli bias and frustration with the Palestinians, the administration has now changed the game and fundamentally altered the U.S. approach of the past three administrations by aligning its view with Israel’s on the country’s final borders.
Washington’s apparent aim is to facilitate Israel’s desire to take the maximum amount of Palestinian land with the least number of Palestinians.
Without an understanding of what was lost and how it happened—and why the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran played such a crucial role in this unraveling—a better future for the Middle East will remain elusive, and the world’s understanding of the region will remain incomplete.
Turkey’s military intervention in Libya, involving the deployment of Syrian fighters, is the latest chess move in a long-running civil war that followed the 2011 revolution, the NATO-led intervention, and the overthrow of the dictator Muammar Qaddafi.
Qaboos seemed an anachronism in his final years on the throne, a temperate leader in an intemperate Middle East. His passing has huge consequences for the fate of his temperate model, with all its imperfections.
Under Soleimani’s command, Iran became the only country in the region capable of harnessing both Shiite extremism and, at times, Sunni radicalism too.
Presidents make lonely, difficult decisions about the use of force to protect U.S. interests—usually with the solace of knowing at least that diplomacy had failed. The tragedy of the current plight is that diplomacy was succeeding before it was abandoned.
As the news of the killing of Qassem Suleimani sunk in, the differences between how it was covered in the West and the reaction in the wider Arab world became clear.