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Qaboos seemed an anachronism in his final years on the throne, a temperate leader in an intemperate Middle East. His passing has huge consequences for the fate of his temperate model, with all its imperfections.
Under Soleimani’s command, Iran became the only country in the region capable of harnessing both Shiite extremism and, at times, Sunni radicalism too.
Presidents make lonely, difficult decisions about the use of force to protect U.S. interests—usually with the solace of knowing at least that diplomacy had failed. The tragedy of the current plight is that diplomacy was succeeding before it was abandoned.
As the news of the killing of Qassem Suleimani sunk in, the differences between how it was covered in the West and the reaction in the wider Arab world became clear.
Altering American foreign policy while maintaining national security imperatives is never a matter of just pulling the plug.
Inside the Islamic Republic, the impact of Soleimani’s death will take years to appreciate. But its immediate effect was to throw the regime a lifeline.
Both President Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have something in common: they both want to hang on to power and a major war between Iran and the United States is not good politics for either one.
A major war with Iran is by no means inevitable. But the killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani is a roll of the dice that just might take us there.
The collateral damage from the strike on Qassem Soleimani will likely be greater than the Trump administration bargained for.
Washington doesn’t have is a realistic approach to dealing with Iran. And with every day that passes, that is more and more painfully apparent.
Soleimani was respected and feared, seen as either the evil mastermind behind policies of death and destruction or the genius architect of Iran’s expansionist policies.
Usually, when the U.S. government changes hands, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East remains steady and consistent. No more.
President Trump’s approach to Iran is muddled by a number of cross-cutting factors which make any policy move on Iran unpredictable.
Will the next decade in the struggle for Palestinian national aspirations be one distinguished by the triumph of international law?
The confrontation and bargaining between the street and the oligarchy will continue, and its outcome will depend on which of the two proves more resilient and adaptive
The military reflects a society divided by sectarianism, with all the paradoxes that entails.
A new president will not mean the end of the old regime rather a continuation of the military involvement in politics.
It would be a tragedy, or worse, a mistake if the only antidote to President Trump’s Middle East policy is a retreat to the magical thinking which has animated so much of America’s moment in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War.
Ostensibly undertaken to rid the capital of militias, the campaign by Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army was in fact a baldfaced grab for power and wealth.
The representation of religion in mainstream media often leaves a great deal to be desired. When it comes to Islam, it is often abysmal.