Carnegie Middle East Center
The negative consequences of pulling out of the JCPOA could be diminished by aligning the goals announced by the Trump administration into an operational, strategic agenda.
While Iran’s positive political transformation may be a worthy goal, the Trump administration’s reckless execution of this strategy could serve to resuscitate an ailing regime.
Europe remains at fault for both failing to rebuild Libya following its 2011 intervention, and for increasingly relying on rights-abusing militias for its coast guard and migrant interdiction responsibilities.
The Trump administration does not have a plan to get Iran to do anything the United States wants. Pompeo’s new strategy to counter Iran’s behavior across the Middle East is just a long wish list of demands.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal appears to have put regime change at the very center of the new American power play against Tehran.
U.S. President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal should propel Europeans to stand their ground and mark the beginning of a more independent role for Europe in the world.
The United States will be worse off from leaving the Iran deal. Either Iran will succeed in exploiting a wedge between America and its allies, leaving Washington isolated and unable to lead a coalition to address other provocations, or Iran will return to an unconstrained nuclear program.
U.S President Donald Trump may have Israel and Saudi Arabia on his side. But without a hint of any strategic contingency planning by the White House, it would appear that the United States can expect to pay for the Iran decision in spades—from western Europe to the Pacific.
Now that the Trump administration has left the JCPOA, EU governments are looking to Washington to set out how they intend to build a negotiated solution to shared concerns.
The Trump administration appears committed to working "by-with-through" local partners in the Middle East. Doing so effectively requires a clear political strategy and continued diplomatic engagement in the region.
While the proxy war in Syria does hold the potential for a clash between U.S. and Russian forces, it is only one of several theaters in which a larger conflict between the two countries is playing out.
The One World of Pax Americana that has existed since the end of the Cold War is already history. US global dominance is still in place, but the peace has been shattered again. The new era is not a replay of the 20th century contest. It may be equally dangerous, but in its own way.
Distilled to its essence, Tehran’s steadfast support for Assad is not driven by the geopolitical or financial interests of the Iranian nation, nor the religious convictions of the Islamic Republic, but by a visceral hatred for the state of Israel.
U.S. President Donald Trump has no intentions of getting stuck in Syria’s civil war.
Policymakers need to learn from their military subordinates: They should keep their heads cool and think of the consequences of their actions, both intended and unintended.
Following the end of the fighting in Syria, displaced refugees will require four things before they return home.
Continued U.S. engagement in Syria is necessary to prevent a resurgence of extremism.
As Pakistan balances cooperation with Iran and its relationship with Saudi Arabia, Indo-Saudi relations are on the rise and Iran continues to play India and Pakistan against each other for its own gain.
The United States cannot ignore nor extricate itself from Syria without durably harming its regional interests and the post-WWII liberal order it helped create. Only through discipline, commitment, and leadership can Washington help bring peace to Syria.
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is based on mutual expectations that are unlikely to be met. It will endure but it is likely to remain far more fraught and complex and, in the years ahead, increasingly less beneficial for the United States.