Carnegie Middle East Center
While the Algerian state, like many others in the region, debates human security and the protection of the most vulnerable, it is this very same state that put women and children at risk.
As conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq move toward de-escalation, postwar reconstruction will be complicated. Each country has a unique postwar outlook, but in all four countries, political reconstruction is a key foundation for long-term economic stability.
Protesters in the marginalized city of Tataouine have successfully forced the hand of Tunisia's government, becoming an inspiration for other struggling regions. But while under tremendous constraints, including a pandemic, is Tunis even capable of delivering on its commitments?
Ten years after its protests sparked the Arab Spring, Tunisia remains the lone country in the Middle East to have effectively changed its system of governance. Yet many Tunisians have mixed feelings about how much progress their country has made.
In an unexpected constitutional decree, Oman’s new sultan created a crown prince position and reconfigured the powers of the country’s two-chamber assembly. But to create real change, he would have to empower the consultative council to truly represent citizens.
To survive its ongoing financial crisis, Lebanon needs a new economic system that addresses massive income inequality. Paired with political and institutional reform, tax reform can help.
The UAE has an opportunity to professionalize the military by building its strategic planning and force development capabilities and by committing to international principles of professional military conduct and greater transparency and accountability.
By pushing economic liberalization in the Middle East without requiring transparency and fighting corruption, international donors have allowed the region’s elites to hog power and resources. The result is a combustible mix of anger and disillusionment.
Despite the Hirak’s few tangible successes, one thing remains sure: there is before and after February 22, 2019.
A new essay collection highlights the negative consequences of the Egyptian military’s heavy involvement in the economy: stunted economic growth, a new ruling class of military officers, and little incentive to enact much-needed reforms.
The appointment of another Algerian at the head of the organization is a tactical mistake for AQIM.
Under the presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, civil-military relations remain imbalanced: but paradoxically, the overwhelming role of the military, also as economic player, combines with the subtle narrowing of the military as cohesive entity.
No community wants to feel it is being engaged with because it is a “problem”—a “difficulty” that has come from “outside.” Rather, they want to be recognized as integral to the society of which they are a part, and given assistance in order to excel—not because the establishment fears them.
A Biden administration is going to be expressing a lot of public dissatisfaction with different elements of the powers struggling for influence in the Middle East–and that will be a significant difference from the Trump era.
Without deep legislative and structural reforms, Lebanon's agricultural sector could suffer severely, pushing even more people out of work and into poverty.
Saeb was a unique figure among Palestinian officials and negotiators with whom we dealt.
Pouring money into health infrastructure will have little effect if qualified doctors have few incentives to stay.
Turkey has begun to take steps toward a more coherent economic policy, but its outcome will ultimately be determined by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The Egyptian military’s involvement in the economy has come at a high cost, contributing to underperformance in development and auguring a new ruling class of military officers.
Armed forces in power and in business will be hard-pressed to implement the complex and painful economic reforms needed to stimulate growth.