Carnegie Middle East Center
The blasts that ripped through Beirut’s historic port could hardly have come at a worse time, as the city struggles with the coronavirus pandemic and an economic crisis. As the smoke clears, the catastrophe has laid bare festering structural weaknesses that are damaging Lebanon’s plural society.
The seismic event felt like an earthquake and an air raid wrapped into one. None of us in Lebanon have ever experienced anything like it.
In Egypt, coronavirus response efforts were led by the prime minister and other technocrats. What does this change mean for Egypt—and how long will it last?
Establishing a credible National Wealth Fund would help to alleviate the country’s multiple crises.
In southern Syria, the regime, opposition, foreign powers, and local groups navigate a contentious zone of conflict. Any shift in this delicate balance could mean yet another escalation.
Iraq’s military responses to the coronavirus pandemic are diverse: creating more tension in Shia civil-military relations, buildingtrust in Sunni civil-military relations, and pushing the government to emphasize sovereignty over externally fueled partisanship.
Applying Israeli law to much of the West Bank would mean the irreversible end of the Palestinian statehood project, making Netanyahu the prime minister who not only buried the two-state solution but annexed choice West Bank real estate.
Washington should press Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to cease his escalating crackdown on peaceful opponents, including journalists, activists, and members of American citizens’ families residing in Egypt.
Nearly a decade after the revolution in Tunisia, much of the crucial legislation designed to protect women exists on paper alone, with significant work remaining to implement the laws.
The religious sphere in Rural Damascus Governorate is poised to become a political battleground as both the regime and the exiled opposition seek to court a new rising group of religious leaders.
Along the Egypt-Sudan border, tensions have been rising for several decades despite limited efforts at cooperation. Both countries need to reexamine their border policies to prevent further escalation.
Having lost the cushion of Gulf support, many Arab states are looking for external financing from international financial institutions and other donors such as China (particularly in North Africa) and the United States.
The Syrian-Turkish border has also allowed Turkey to play a greater role in Syria, fulfilling Turkish regional ambitions while also generating economic activity ensuring that internally displaced Syrian refugees remain inside Syria.
Egyptian and Turkish military businesses have used their institutional privileges to dominate their respective economies, but they have key differences. Turkey’s military businesses are centrally managed while Egypt’s use multiple complex conglomerates.
Faced with no shortage of domestic challenges, Erdogan is expanding Turkey’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean—and antagonizing Europe in turn.
The armies’ responses to the protests in Arab countries, in 2011 and 2019, towards their respective regimes varied from one country to another.
Egypt has a yawning generation gap and a regime that wants to reach youth. A new academy may help, but Egypt’s past is littered with similar, failed attempts.
Smuggling goods across the border between Algeria and Tunisia has created a parallel economy for marginalized border populations. Law enforcement and smugglers alike must navigate these gray zones in state authority.
Despite the fiscal and economic challenges, President Tebboune has made it clear that Algeria will not seek a loan to ease the country’s socio-economic woes.
Divisions dating to the June 2017 split among Gulf Cooperation Council states have shaped the region’s contrasting approaches to political messaging and public health in a time of observance.