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Airbnb says it will no longer list properties to rent in the occupied West Bank. Other companies will be watching to see what happens next.
There’s an un-American way to make the pink wave permanent.
President Trump’s statement about the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was met with widespread criticism from around the world. He has set the United States down a road that breaks longstanding foreign policy precedent.
Egypt’s new administrative capital, currently under construction—and tentatively named Wedian, which means “desert valleys”— represents concretely where President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been trying to take his country during his five years of authoritarian rule.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has recently taken a significant step in its nuclear research and development program that at the same time illuminates Riyadh’s best route for demonstrating transparency in nuclear safeguards.
Why has Turkey responded to the murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi so vocally?
The Iraqi Islamic Party has demonstrated resilience over the last fifteen years, but unless it can increase its popularity, it is unlikely to regain a meaningful role in governing Iraq.
Algeria’s president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has been dismissing high-profile security officials at an unprecedented rate without any public explanation from Bouteflika or his inner circle.
Under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has pursued policies that have undermined both U.S. interests and values.
Reimposed U.S. sanctions on Iran are short on details and risk leaving U.S. partners uncertain about Washington’s intentions.
Khashoggi’s murder has elicited that rarest of reactions in contemporary U.S. politics: bipartisan consensus.
Efforts to reconstitute and rebuild state security institutions in post-conflict states will require not just technical and organizational fixes, but will hinge upon a range of sweeping steps and reforms with generational scope.
The reconfiguration of power relations in Yemen has resulted in a hybridized military.
Today Iraq looks like a plurality of competing but fluid centers of power linked to domestic and/or external patrons.
The integration of foreign and informal forces in Syria makes success in restoring pre-2011 unified security sector governance improbable.
The determination that both the LAF and Hezbollah wish to play a larger role shaping Lebanese national security politics suggests that there may not be enough room for two preeminent military institutions in post-war Lebanon.
Defense sectors in several Arab countries have undergone significant transformation leading to the hybridization of security governance, leaving them with forms of sovereignty that are both constrained and constantly contested.
The hybridization of security governance in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen leaves them with forms of sovereignty that are both constrained and constantly contested.
Although stabilization programs were not part of the Syrian political transformation initially envisioned, they did cultivate more inclusive, capable local governance. But with larger military and political factors shaping outcomes on the ground in Syria, what will endure of this?
If Khashoggi’s killing is to have any lasting meaning and impact, it should offer up both a moment of clarity and a warning to the Trump administration to restore reciprocity and balance to a relationship that’s now out of control.