Khashoggi’s murder has elicited that rarest of reactions in contemporary U.S. politics: bipartisan consensus.
Efforts to reconstitute and rebuild state security institutions in post-conflict states will require not just technical and organizational fixes, but will hinge upon a range of sweeping steps and reforms with generational scope.
The reconfiguration of power relations in Yemen has resulted in a hybridized military.
Today Iraq looks like a plurality of competing but fluid centers of power linked to domestic and/or external patrons.
The integration of foreign and informal forces in Syria makes success in restoring pre-2011 unified security sector governance improbable.
The determination that both the LAF and Hezbollah wish to play a larger role shaping Lebanese national security politics suggests that there may not be enough room for two preeminent military institutions in post-war Lebanon.
Defense sectors in several Arab countries have undergone significant transformation leading to the hybridization of security governance, leaving them with forms of sovereignty that are both constrained and constantly contested.
The hybridization of security governance in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen leaves them with forms of sovereignty that are both constrained and constantly contested.
Although stabilization programs were not part of the Syrian political transformation initially envisioned, they did cultivate more inclusive, capable local governance. But with larger military and political factors shaping outcomes on the ground in Syria, what will endure of this?
If Khashoggi’s killing is to have any lasting meaning and impact, it should offer up both a moment of clarity and a warning to the Trump administration to restore reciprocity and balance to a relationship that’s now out of control.
The Arab Middle East faces unprecedented socioeconomic, political, and institutional challenges. Amid burgeoning conflict and economic stagnation, trust has eroded between governments and their citizens.
More than any other region in the world, the Middle East is defined not by commercial ties, diplomatic interaction, or regional organizations, but by hard power and military might.
The outrageous murder of the Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul has brought into sharp relief the deepening conflict between Riyadh and Ankara.
The United States, which currently holds the Financial Action Task Force presidency and wants to impose “unprecedented financial pressure” on Iran, almost certainly opposed the 2019 extension.
Jamal Khashoggi’s murder demands a meaningful response from the United States. Washington has a responsibility to stand up for U.S. residents and for the free press.
Jamal Khashoggi vanished in Istanbul. But the key to understanding the Saudi reaction to his disappearance lies in Riyadh.
The conflicts generating mass population movements from and within the Middle East have become global in nature, and their destabilizing effect can be felt far beyond its borders. Addressing their ramifications requires bold leadership and a sense of shared responsibility at the global, regional, and national levels.
Arab regimes have established a set formula for managing state-citizen relations: government services in exchange for public consent. Over the past seven years, changes to the government-citizen relationship in the Arab world have reshaped citizens’ perceptions of what they owe their government and what they can expect from it.
The fundamental bargain underpinning stability in Middle Eastern states is coming undone, and unless regional leaders move quickly to strike new bargains with their citizens, even larger storms will come.
The possible involvement in the disappearance of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi presents the U.S.-Saudi relationship with its greatest crisis since 9/11. The question that remains is how the Trump administration will respond.