What the U.S. government, and particularly Congress, can do is scrutinize engagement with and assistance to Egypt in order to ensure that they promote stability for the nation rather than one man rule.
Both Hamas and Hezbollah have taken a flexible approach to maintaining their political influence. This has allowed them to weather the ups and downs of their relationship in recent years.
Erdogan’s new partner in parliament—the ultranationalist MHP—will make Ankara a more belligerent and intransigent ally.
The nature of the conflict in Tunisia’s northwest differs from the country’s other security challenges in that it mirrors an insurgency rather than a protracted terrorist campaign.
With his reelection as president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has become Turkey’s most powerful leader since World War II. However, two key considerations will constrain how Erdogan uses his prerogatives.
While New Delhi has begun to build on the synergies with the United Arab Emirates on counter-terrorism and long-term strategic economic cooperation, it has barely scratched the surface of what is possible in the domain of defense.
For the citizens of Turkey, the upcoming elections boil down to a choice between a one-man-rule system with no checks and balances and a possible return to a more liberal and parliamentary system of governance.
Without a firm constitutional basis, early elections in Libya would not only produce a government whose legitimacy is contested even more widely, but also leave the door open for another strongman to rise to power.
Whatever the outcome of Turkey’s June 24 elections, a new presidential system will come into effect and the foreign policy, economic, and social ramifications will be significant.
The negative consequences of pulling out of the JCPOA could be diminished by aligning the goals announced by the Trump administration into an operational, strategic agenda.
While Iran’s positive political transformation may be a worthy goal, the Trump administration’s reckless execution of this strategy could serve to resuscitate an ailing regime.
Europe remains at fault for both failing to rebuild Libya following its 2011 intervention, and for increasingly relying on rights-abusing militias for its coast guard and migrant interdiction responsibilities.
The Trump administration does not have a plan to get Iran to do anything the United States wants. Pompeo’s new strategy to counter Iran’s behavior across the Middle East is just a long wish list of demands.
Absent effective institutions, Libya has struggled and devolved into civil war since the fall of Qaddafi. But while the country has dropped off Western radars since the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi, the story of Libya is far from finished.
Gulf-based Salafi financiers have had a diminished role in the Syrian civil war recently, but their influence will linger in the country's religious sphere.
While the Middle East’s central battle line is changing, Egypt is pursuing a strategy of opportunism that aims to maximize its returns and preserve its options.
Tunisia’s decentralization process has tremendous potential. Yet the central government, local government, civil society, and international donors must each invest in the process.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal appears to have put regime change at the very center of the new American power play against Tehran.
U.S. President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal should propel Europeans to stand their ground and mark the beginning of a more independent role for Europe in the world.
The United States will be worse off from leaving the Iran deal. Either Iran will succeed in exploiting a wedge between America and its allies, leaving Washington isolated and unable to lead a coalition to address other provocations, or Iran will return to an unconstrained nuclear program.