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Pouring money into health infrastructure will have little effect if qualified doctors have few incentives to stay.
The Egyptian military’s involvement in the economy has come at a high cost, contributing to underperformance in development and auguring a new ruling class of military officers.
Armed forces in power and in business will be hard-pressed to implement the complex and painful economic reforms needed to stimulate growth.
The Egyptian military’s involvement in the economy has come at a high cost, contributing to underperformance in development.
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has reinvigorated state capitalism in Egypt through military-led real estate development, industrial hubs, extractive activities, private sector encroachment, and using private investment to recapitalize the public sector.
The successful completion of Egypt’s 2016 IMF program is superficial, hiding poor economic growth relative to emerging market peers and an economy burdened by a military-led public sector.
The Egyptian military’s capture of state resources under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi depends on a poorly run state and the visible corruption of the former regime, auguring a new ruling class of military officers.
Egypt’s recent security and macro-economic stabilization has been built on weak foundations and Covid-19 has further exposed this fragility.
Egypt has long sought to expand habitation and agriculture into the desert, but the obstacles are great.
In an interview, Soli Özel explains the multifaceted nature of Turkey’s ambitions in the Middle East and North Africa.
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