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Egypt’s recent security and macro-economic stabilization has been built on weak foundations and Covid-19 has further exposed this fragility.
Egypt has long sought to expand habitation and agriculture into the desert, but the obstacles are great.
In an interview, Soli Özel explains the multifaceted nature of Turkey’s ambitions in the Middle East and North Africa.
In Egypt, coronavirus response efforts were led by the prime minister and other technocrats. What does this change mean for Egypt—and how long will it last?
Washington should press Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to cease his escalating crackdown on peaceful opponents, including journalists, activists, and members of American citizens’ families residing in Egypt.
The Egyptian military may intervene in neighboring Libya, but it likely wants to avoid a major confrontation.
Along the Egypt-Sudan border, tensions have been rising for several decades despite limited efforts at cooperation. Both countries need to reexamine their border policies to prevent further escalation.
Having lost the cushion of Gulf support, many Arab states are looking for external financing from international financial institutions and other donors such as China (particularly in North Africa) and the United States.
Egyptian and Turkish military businesses have used their institutional privileges to dominate their respective economies, but they have key differences. Turkey’s military businesses are centrally managed while Egypt’s use multiple complex conglomerates.
Egypt has a yawning generation gap and a regime that wants to reach youth. A new academy may help, but Egypt’s past is littered with similar, failed attempts.
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