Authoritarian military politics in North Africa will be shaped by relations between the military and the head of state, dynamics within the coercive sector, marginalization of the private sector, and the ability of state actors to leverage foreign support.
As Egypt and Ethiopia negotiate the details of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, tensions are on the rise. Sudan, which has vested interest in the dam, too, could be an essential third party to smooth over the disputes.
By impeding research, Egypt curtails knowledge that can help resolve crises, especially in border areas.
In an interview, Sherif Mohyeldeen discusses the challenges of healthcare in Egypt’s border areas.
A new essay collection highlights the negative consequences of the Egyptian military’s heavy involvement in the economy: stunted economic growth, a new ruling class of military officers, and little incentive to enact much-needed reforms.
Egypt’s closing of the inquiry into the Regeni murder is Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi’s way of avoiding challenges from within.
Under the presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, civil-military relations remain imbalanced: but paradoxically, the overwhelming role of the military, also as economic player, combines with the subtle narrowing of the military as cohesive entity.
Pouring money into health infrastructure will have little effect if qualified doctors have few incentives to stay.
The Egyptian military’s involvement in the economy has come at a high cost, contributing to underperformance in development and auguring a new ruling class of military officers.
Armed forces in power and in business will be hard-pressed to implement the complex and painful economic reforms needed to stimulate growth.