Dissatisfied with Washington, Riyadh has undertaken an activist strategy for restoring regional order—but its forceful interventions abroad mask a deep domestic malaise.
Almost four years later, the opportunity for political transition in the Middle East and North Africa seems to have narrowed.
While recognizing a Palestinian state could play a modest role in unblocking peace negotiations, it can only offer a partial solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As Tunisia prepares to enter a new phase in its process of democratization, two key challenges face the country’s government: the economy and security.
The tactics of decay and infiltration, used by the Algerian authorities when confronted with the Armed Islamic Group in the 1990s, could prove useful in countering the Islamic State’s threat in Syria and Iraq.
Jabhat al-Nusra is clearly positioning itself in anticipation of developments on the ground. How does that reflect what it believes—or knows—the Islamic State is preparing to do?
Big business has been virtually excluded from recent stimulus plans designed to get Egypt’s wheels spinning after years in recession. However, long-term recovery and stabilization are quite dependent on the resumption of activities by large private enterprises, which still control key sectors of the economy.
Despite all the similarities that emerge at first glance, there are deep structural, political, and social differences between Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis (Ansar Allah) in Yemen.
The Gulf Initiative has failed to bring peace to Yemen, prompting the need for a new initiative that is more realistic and includes a long-term economic and development plan.
If local ceasefires are implemented while the coalition continues to attack the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra without also empowering the Free Syrian Army, the latter will be the clear loser in the ensuing scenario.